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stated that "the government may not use an administrative in-
spection scheme to search for criminal violations.", 12 83
Administrative searches that are conducted without valid purposes
allow the state to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. Because the evidence was obtained as a result of an
illegal search, defendant's motion to suppress was granted. 1284
FAMILY COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
In re Marrhonda G. 1285
(decided July 25, 1991)
Defendant, a juvenile, was arrested and charged with weapons
possession. 1286 At her pre-trial suppression hearing, she argued
that her right to be protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated because the police, without a warrant,
opened her closed duffel bag and removed four weapons and 150
rounds of ammunition. 1287 The court held that the defendant's
right against unreasonable searches and seizures was not vio-
lated. 1288 The court analyzed this case under the "plain touch"
doctrine -- a corollary to the "plain view" doctrine. 1289
The defendant was being detained at the Youth Services Unit
office in Manhattan after a Port Authority police officer
suspected that she was a runaway and sought to verify the
information she provided him.1290 Defendant was ordered to
"put down" the duffel bag she was carrying and "to sit down in
1283. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 at 724 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1284. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see the cases analysis of
People v. Keta, supra notes 1159-207 and accompanying text.
1285. 575 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Fam. Ct. New York County 1991).
1286. Id. at 427.
1287. Id. See N.Y. CONS'r. art. I, § 12; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1288. Marrhonda, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
1289. Id. at 429-31.
1290. Id. at 427.
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a chair in the back of the room." 1291 The defendant was
separated from her bag by approximately 15 feet. 1292 Upon
approaching the defendant to speak with her, another officer
picked up the bag "'to put it someplace... off the floor"' and
felt "'the butt of [a] gun[,] the trigger guard and then . . . the
rest of the gun . . "',1293 The officer who had originally
detained the youth was called over to feel the bag, and after veri-
fying that the object in the bag felt like a gun, the two men
opened defendant's duffel bag and recovered the contraband and
some clothing. 1294
Initially, the court determined that the officer who detained the
youth "had the [requisite] probable cause to believe respondent
was a runaway, and that respondent's detention at the youth fa-
cility was lawful" under the so-called "runaway statute." 1295
The court concluded that the officer's actions in touching the bag
to move it off a walkway floor was lawful and the officers' testi-
mony to that effect was "not . . . 'patently tailored to nullify
constitutional objections'... nor simply a contrived setup for an
impermissible search." 1296 The court found that the initial
touching was "essentially inadvertent.", 1297 The only remaining
issue to be resolved was whether or not the officers were justified
in opening defendant's duffel bag to retrieve its contents. 1298




1294. Id. at 427-28.
1295. Id. at 428; see N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 718 (McKinney 1983). Section
718(b) provides, in pertinent part:
[A] police officer is authorized to take a child who has run away from
home or who, in the reasonable opinion of the officer, appears to have
run away from home, to a facility certified for such purpose by the
division for youth or to a facility approved by the state department of
social services.
Id.
1296. Marrhonda, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 428 (citations omitted) (quoting People
v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88, 353 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (2d Dep't 1974)).
1297. Id.
1298. Id. at 428-29.
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respondent's duffel bag was "incident" to a lawful arrest. 1299 In
this area of inquiry the court noted that New York, pursuant to its
constitution, has adopted a more restrictive method of inter-
preting "incident" than is utilized under federal law. 1300 To jus-
tify a closed bag search in New York, the "bag must be within
the 'grabbable area' and exigent circumstances must be present,
i.e., the need to protect the safety of the public or the arresting
officers, or to protect evidence from destruction or conceal-
ment."' 1301 The court found that the warrantless search of the in-
terior of defendant's bag was not justified as being incident to a
lawful arrest because the bag and the respondent were separated
by approximately fifteen feet. 1302
Notwithstanding this finding, the court continued its inquiry to
determine if there was an "alternative constitutional theory" upon
which to validate the entry into respondent's duffel bag. 1303
Locating such a theory, the court, for the first time in New York,
extended the "plain view" doctrine, recognized under the Fourth
Amendment 1304 and also under the New York State Constitution,
to include the doctrine of "plain touch." The "plain touch"
doctrine is a counterpart to the "plain view" doctrine and has
been extended under the Fourth Amendment by four United
States Circuit Courts of Appeal. 130 5 Utilizing the "plain touch"
1299. Id.
1300. Id. at 429; see People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 51, 432 N.E.2d 745,
745, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 873 (1982) ("The identical wording of [the federal
fourth amendment and the New York State Constitution article I, § 12] does
not proscribe our more strictly construing the State Constitution than the
Supreme Court has construed the Federal Constitution.").
1301. Marrhonda, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
1302. Id.
1303. Id.
1304. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (holding that police
must have a search warrant to search luggage during a proper search of an
automobile); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (warrantless
search of car in driveway was not permissible even incident to lawful arrest).
1305. Marrhonda, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (citing United States v. Williams,
822 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Norman, 701 F.2d 295 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983); United States v. Russell, 655 F.2d
1261 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 108 (1982); United States v.
Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d
1050 [Vol 8
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doctrine, the court denied respondent's motion to suppress the
weapons seized from her duffel bag. 1
306
In reaching this conclusion, the court analogized the facts of
Marrhonda to those of United States v. Williams.1307 In
Williams, an officer opened a closed paper bag and withdrew its
contents after he felt the presence of controlled substances from
the outside of the bag. 130 8 The Williams court concluded that "no
warrant is needed for an opening of a container whose unlawful
contents becomes known through a lawful touching of the
outside,"' 1309 and unanimously upheld the denial of defendant's
motion to suppress the use of the controlled substances as
evidence at his trial. 1310 However, in an effort to preserve
traditional Fourth Amendment concerns, the court in Williams set
forth three conditions which must be satisfied before the "plain
touch" doctrine can properly be invoked: (1) "an officer [must
be] legally authorized to touch the container in the first
place[;]" 1311 (2) the 'touch' is limited to the "initial contact with
the container[;]" 1312 and (3) the lawful touching must convince
the officer "to a reasonable certainty" that the container holds
contraband or evidence of a crime.
1313
Applying these conditions to the facts in Marrhonda, the court
found that:
[The] initial contact with respondent's bag, in picking it up to
move it off the floor, was legally permissible[;] [the officer's]
1313 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981); United States v.
Diaz, 577 F.2d 821 (1978)).
1306. Marrhonda, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
1307. 822 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
1308. Id. at 1177.
1309. Id. at 1184.
1310. Id. at 1190.
1311. Id. at 1184. The court explained that the officer must "lawfully
occupy the vantage point from which [his] observations are made ... ."ld.
1312. Id. The court stated that an officer is "not free to continue to
manipulate [the container] in an attempt to discern the contents." Id.
1313. Id. at 1184. The court, in Marrhonda, noted that the third condition
requires more than "traditional 'probable cause"' to be satisfied - the "'level
of conviction must be objectively reasonable in light of the officer's past
experience and training, and capable of verification by a reviewing court."'
1992] 1051
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feel of the gun butt and trigger guard and the rest of the gun was
essentially simultaneous and did not involve any improper degree
of manipulation or exploration[; and his] touch of the bag made
him 'certain' (whether that be defined as "reasonably certain" or
'virtually certain') that he felt a weapon. 1314
The court also found that "the officer's certitude [was]
'objectively reasonable' and 'capable of verification' by the
court" because the weapon touched was described with speci-
ficity, the officer was highly trained and experienced and the
court was able to view the bag and its contents because they were
introduced into evidence and used in a re-enactment of the inci-
dent. 1315 In light of the foregoing, the court held that the
"seizure of the weapons and ammunitions was proper and
therefore the motion to suppress was denied.- 1316
Marrhonda, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (quoting Williams, 822 F.2d at 1185).
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